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4The paper proposes a structural empirical model capable of examining exchange rate smoothing in the
small, open economy of Hungary. The framework assumes the existence of an unobserved and chang-
ing implicit exchange rate target. The central bank is assumed to use interest rate policy to obtain this
preferred rate in the medium term, while market participants are assumed to form rational expectations
about this target and influence exchange rates accordingly. 
The paper applies unobserved variable method – Kalman filtering – to estimate this implicit exchange
rate target, and simultaneously estimate an interest rate rule and an exchange rate equation consistent
with this target. The results provide evidence for exchange rate smoothing in Hungary by providing an
estimated smooth implicit exchange rate target development and by showing significant interest rate
response to the deviation of the exchange rate from this target. The method also provides estimates for
the ceteris paribus exchange rate effects of expected and unexpected interest rate changes.
JEL classification: E52, F31, F41
Keywords: exchange rate smoothing, interest rate rules, Kalman filter
Abstract 
Az empirikus tanulmány strukturális modellkeretben vizsgálja az árfolyamsimítás hatásait Magyarorszá-
gon az inflációs célkövetés rendszerének 2001-es bevezetése óta. A megközelítés egy idõben változó,
és közvetlenül nem megfigyelhetõ árfolyamcélt feltételez. A modell alapján a központi bank kamatpoli-
tikájával az implicit árfolyamcél középtávú fenntartására törekszik, miközben a piaci szereplõk racioná-
lis várakozásokat alakítanak ki a célról, és ennek megfelelõen befolyásolják az árfolyam-alakulást. 
A tanulmány a nem megfigyelhetõ változók egy módszerét – az ún. Kalman-szûrõt – alkalmazza az imp-
licit árfolyamcél számszerû becslésére, miközben a céllal konzisztens szimultán becslést készít az ár-
folyamegyenletrõl és a központi bank által követett kamatszabályról. Az árfolyamsimítás magyarorszá-
gi jelenlétét megerõsíti egyrészt a becsült árfolyamcél stabil alakulása, másrészt, hogy az árfolyam el-
térése a céltól szignifikáns kamatreakciót vált ki. A megközelítés számszerû becslést ad a várt és vá-
ratlan kamatváltozások árfolyamhatására.
Árfolyamsimítás Magyarországon
5This paper is part of the transmission mechanism research of the Central Bank of Hungary, and its main
motivation is to explore futher the interrelationship of short term interest rate and exchange rate devel-
opment in Hungary using high frequency data. It argues that this relationship is strongly influenced by
the systematic exchange rate smoothing behavior of the central bank, and applies a methodology
which is capable of numerically assess some of its effects. 
In open economies, like Hungary, exchange rate can play an important role in the transmission mech-
anism, and its volatility can cause various, potentially substantial welfare distortions. These considera-
tions provide incentives for the central bank – even in pure inflation targeting frameworks – to pay atten-
tion to the exchange rate developments (Svensson, 2000, and Taylor, 2001). The empirical exchange
rate smoothing or ”fear of floating” literature presents evidence that many open economy central banks
indeed use direct and indirect methods to influence exchange rate developments in practice (Calvo-
Reinhart, 2000). One strand of this empirical literature examines the exchange rate smoothing behav-
ior of central banks by estimating open economy interest rate rules with an exchange rate term (Clarida,
Galí and Gertler, 1997 and Mohanty and Klau, 2004). This term is usually proxied by the depreciation
of the exchange rate theoretically motivated by some vague ”lean against the wind” interest rate poli-
cy. This paper suggests a more structural approach which assumes that, on the one hand, the central
bank has a preferred exchange rate level and uses its interest rate policy to maintain this target in the
medium term, and, on the other, market participants form rational expectations about the monetary pol-
icy and influence the current exchange rate accordingly. 
In most cases, this preferred exchange rate level is not directly observable, because strategic consid-
erations make the central bank silent, or sufficiently vague about it. But – given it is persistent – past
interest rate decisions of the central bank provide informative signals about this unobserved target vari-
able. Furthermore, assuming rational expectations and forward looking price determination in the for-
eign exchange market (e.g. uncovered interest parity), current exchange rate developments will reflect
the market participants' best assessment of this target. This means that the econometrician can also
use the behavior of the exchange rate to gain a better estimation of the unobserved target.
The paper applies Kalman filtering to gain the best linear estimate of the unobserved exchange rate tar-
get variable and simultaneously estimate an interest rate rule and an exchange rate equation consis-
tent with this target. The estimated system is able to provide interest rate and exchange rate impulse
responses to known changes in the exchange rate target, and premium shocks. Furthermore, it can also
provide estimates for the ceteris paribus exchange rate effects of expected and unexpected interest
rate changes, where the latter takes into consideration that an unexpected interest rate move changes
the market participants' beliefs about the central bank's exchange rate target.
The paper uses weekly data during a fairly homogeneous period from the widening of the exchange
rate band in May 2001 to the end of 2004. The frequency of the data provides a moderately large sam-
ple, but hinders the usage of more fundamental variables – like inflation or output – in the estimated
rules. Not considering these variables in the interest rate rule can be partly justified by the communi-
1. Introduction
6cation of the Central Bank of Hungary (CBH) during the period. The CBH stressed its belief on the small
direct influence of the interest rate on the aggregate demand, and argued that the major influence of its
interest rate policy is exerted through its effect on the exchange rate. The framework does not estimate
the effects of these fundamental variables on the exchange rate target either.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical results about the welfare impli-
cations of exchange rate smoothing in the recent New Open Economy literature. The section also pres-
ents some empirical results emphasizing the widespread use of exchange rate smoothing in small and
open economies. Section 3 presents some evidence for exchange rate smoothing in Hungary using the
explicit exchange rate target announcements of the Central Bank of Hungary available up to the end of
2003. Section 4 presents the unobserved variable framework and the estimation results. Section 5 con-
cludes.
72. Exchange rate smoothing
In small and open economies, exchange rate development can have a substantial influence on prices
and output, which makes it a potentially important indirect channel of the transmission mechanism. It
does not necessarily mean, however, that open economy central banks should also smooth the
exchange rate, i.e. react directly to exchange rate developments by their interest rate policy. Along
these lines have Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001) and Galí and Monacelli (2002) questioned the seminal
arguments of Ball (1997) and Svensson (2000) supporting exchange rate smoothing. Applying micro-
founded models capable of welfare analysis CGG and GM argued that the existence of the exchange
rate channel does not theoretically imply any reason for exchange rate smoothing. In their frameworks,
there are only quantitative differences between closed and open economy monetary policy problems:
the exchange rate channel makes the aggregate demand more responsive to interest rate policy and it
increases the importance of output gap stabilization. But as the exchange rate variability causes no dis-
tortions in these models, there are no reasons for any nominal exchange rate smoothing; or for stabi-
lization of wider inflation aggregates than domestic inflation.
Justification for exchange rate smoothing, however, reappears in the microfounded models as well, if
the various potential welfare distortions caused by exchange rate volatility are also considered. Benigno
and Benigno (2001), for example, argued for the positive welfare effects of exchange rate smoothing in
a two country open economy model. In their model, deviations from the flexible terms of trade – result-
ing from excess nominal exchange rate fluctuations and sticky prices – cause distortions in production
among the countries, leading to lower joint welfare. According to their centralized welfare criterion, rules
with interest rate smoothing and explicit reactions to exchange rates – similarly to the one estimated in
this paper – can approximate the first best optimal policies.
Microbased models considering only the welfare of an individual country have also found justifications
for exchange rate smoothing. One line of recent research, for example, justified it by the welfare con-
sequences of imperfect exchange rate pass-through – a general finding in empirical works (see e.g.
Campa and Goldberg, 2004) –, which makes the producers' profits dependent on the exchange rate
development. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) found reasons for exchange rate smoothing in their two-coun-
try open-economy framework, and similar results were replicated in small open economy models as
well. McCallum and Nelson (2001), for example, consider imports as inputs for production, which
implies that exchange rate development influence the costs of production. Excess volatility of the
exchange rate reduces welfare, because in the sticky price framework firms adjust their prices only
gradually. Optimal monetary policy is found to smooth exchange rate also in the small open economy
model of Monacelli (2003), which introduces imperfect pass-through to the model of Galí and Monacelli
(2002) considering imports as consumption goods. The reason is that deviations from the law of one
price due to imperfect pass-through cause welfare costs, which an optimizing monetary policy should
counteract. Other justifications also exist in the current literature: in a novel example, Faia and Monacelli
(2002) examine the role of external borrowing in a model with imperfect capital markets and find further
justifications for exchange rate smoothing.
If one assumes that exchange rate stability is beneficial for welfare, the quantitative importance of a
rule-based direct reaction to exchange rate development might increase further, as argued by
Monacelli (2003). Rule-based decision-making can have important advantages in dynamic monetary
policy settings, as, thereby, the central bank can have essential effects on expectations. Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) argued that a rule based policy can improve the short-run inflation-output tradeoff in
case of persistent supply shocks. The reason is that the stronger interest rate response to shocks influ-
ences the inflation expectations by promising tough responses to further shocks. Woodford (1999), sim-
ilarly, argues that the observed interest rate smoothing of central banks can be justified by assuming
that they would like to meet their inflation and output targets without causing much interest rate volatil-
ity, which they can obtain by committing to a rule which helps them influence inflation expectations.
Following these lines of reasoning, commitment to exchange rate smoothing might improve the effi-
ciency of the central bank in influencing exchange rates by guiding exchange rate expectations. As an
illustration, consider a generalized UIP equation with a persistent premium shock 
where s
t 
is the nominal exchange rate, i
t
is the interest rate differential and μ
t 
is the premium shock.
Ruling out bubbles and solving the difference equation forward we can get:
showing that the expected exchange rate is influenced by an expected long term nominal exchange
rate (E
t
s
T
) and the expected interest rate determination and premium shock development up to date T.
The UIP equation implies that by following an exchange rate smoothing interest rate rule, the monetary
policy can influence the exchange rate (s
t
) not only through the current interest rate differential (i
t
), but
also through the exchange rate expectations [E
t 
(s
t+1
)]. If one assumes that besides exchange rate sta-
bility, monetary policy also prefers smooth interest rate developments, it can improve the short-run
trade-off between these two variables by committing to an interest rate rule which reacts to a premium
shock more strongly, than its optimal discretionary counterpart.
Turning to the empirical results, in a widely recognized article, Calvo and Reinhart (2000) found over-
whelming evidence about exchange rate smoothing – or with their words ”fear of floating” – in a wide
range of open – mostly, but not exclusively emerging – economies. Examining volatilities and correla-
tions of various variables, countries were shown to use direct foreign exchange market interventions
and interest rate policy to avoid large exchange rate fluctuations. They present it as evidence support-
ing their claim that countries do not do what they actually say: despite the evidence of real life exchange
rate smoothing, IMF classification shows a clear tendency towards floating exchange rate arrange-
ments. But this evidence can be approached from a different angle: that countries tend to move towards
reduced transparency about their exchange rate policy. A floating exchange rate regime, by itself, is a
non-transparent arrangement, with no explicit information about any exchange rate target or accepted
exchange rate volatility. This general tendency towards reduced transparency – with the notable excep-
tion in Europe – can be justified by the increasingly liberalized capital markets and the existence of
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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speculative capital, which seem to have contributed to the excess exchange rate volatility in countries
with transparent arrangements (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995b). The reduced transparency, thereby,
might be seen as a further measure to contribute to the smooth development of the exchange rate.
In a seminal paper estimating monetary policy rules in the G3 (US, Japan, Germany) and E3 (UK, Italy,
France) countries, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1997) also find evidence for exchange rate smoothing,
especially in the E3 countries. In their estimated interest rate rules with reactions to anticipated inflation,
and output gap, they also examined the role of exchange rate or – which also implies exchange rate
smoothing – the interest rate of a partner country. They have found some, but quantitatively not impor-
tant evidence for exchange rate smoothing among G3 countries, but this effect was much stronger
among the E3 countries and Germany, which eventually initiated a ”hard ERM” policy with fixed
exchange rates.  In a more recent paper, Mohanty and Klau (2004) examined robust interest rate rules
in 13 emerging countries countaining also an exchange rate term. The significant estimated exchange
rate depreciation terms make the authors conclude that their result support the hypothesis of exchange
rate smoothing or ”fear of floating” in these countries.
The verbal announcements of the central banks about their preferred exchange rate target, if they
are specific enough, can provide a straightforward proxy for the unobserved exchange rate target
variable. By announcing its exchange rate target, the central bank, on the one hand, might be able
to influence expectations and thereby might gain some leverage over the exchange rate develop-
ments. On the other hand, however, announcing explicit exchange rate targets can have serious
drawbacks, as they can easily be mistaken as nominal anchors potentially in conflict with other
anchors (e.g. inflation target), and an explicit target – as a fixed exchange rate – could provide a
focal point for speculation against the exchange rate. But if the central bank chooses to announce its
exchange rate target, announcements, in most cases, might be considered truthful, as it can be
assumed that reputational considerations prevent central banks from lying to financial markets with
fast learning abilities. It might be noted, though, that even if the announcements are considered truth-
ful, their influence on the rates and market expectations might be limited, as the ability and willing-
ness of the central bank to influence exchange rates might be considered questionable by market
participants.
The Central Bank of Hungary was unusually explicit about its preferred exchange rate target even
after abandoning its narrow band crawling peg exchange rate regime in May 2001. Functioning in a
”shadow ERM II” ±15% exchange rate band and following inflation targeting, it periodically
10
3. Estimates using announced targets
Figure 1
The exchange rate, the announced target and interest rates (June 2001–December 2003, weekly data)
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announced an exchange rate target it considered preferable and in line with its inflation targets. It
maintained this policy of exchange rate transparency up until the end of 2003, when it fully aban-
doned it. Using the Statements by the Monetary Council, a periodically changing exchange rate tar-
get variable can be put together from June 2001 till December 2003.
1
Figure 1 shows the weekly
announced preferred exchange rate of the Central Bank of Hungary together with the HUF/EUR
exchange rate, the policy rate differential
2
and the difference between the 3 month interbank lending
rates.
The graph shows the close relationship between the announced target and the exchange rate.
However, there were periods – during the second half of 2001 (the financial crisis in Argentina) and in
2003 (after the devaluation of the forint exchange rate band), for example – when there were significant
gaps between the exchange rate and the announced target. In these periods, we can also observe
higher interest rates suggesting some exchange rate smoothing behavior of the central bank.
To examine the relationships formally, Phillips-Hansen fully modified OLS method is applied, as it is a
robust methodology handling the facts that 1) the variables follow unit root processes (see appendix
6.1), 2) the shocks can be autoregressive and 3) simultaneity is expected to exist between exchange
rate and interest rate developments (see Phillips and Hansen, 1990). The exchange rate equation is
estimated in the following unrestricted form: 
(1)
where s
t
is the exchange rate, i
t
is the interest rate differential, s
t
* is the announced exchange rate tar-
get, and μ
t 
is a premium shock.
3
The parameter χ measures the immediate effect of the target on the
exchange rate, while the framework – by including a lagged exchange rate term, and allowing persist-
ent shocks – allows for a gradual adjustment to this exchange rate target. The estimation results of the
exchange rate equation using short term interest rates with 2 week and 3 months maturities are pre-
sented in Table 1.
The results show significant effects of the announced exchange rate targets on the exchange rate,
even allowing for the appearance of the lagged exchange rate in the equation. The sum of estimat-
ed coefficients (χ+δ) of the exchange rate terms, furthermore, does not significantly differ from 1
according to the fully modified Wald test supporting the view that the exchange rate would fully adjust
to the target level under 0 interest rate differential (though the marginally significant constant terms
might cast some doubts for this result). The results show gradual, but relatively fast adjustment to the
target level (approximately one third of the difference disappears weekly). The stability properties of
1
Between the speculative attack of 17 January, occurred against the strong edge of the exchange rate band, and 26 May 2003, when the Monetary
Council explicitly announced the end of it, the Central Bank of Hungary intervened in the exchange market by gradually reselling the euro it bought
during the attack. Although, there were no announcements about any new preferred exchange rate, the behavior of the CB on the exchange mar-
ket provided clear price signals about a preferred exchange rate around 245 HUF/EUR.
2
The difference between the interest paid on 2 week deposits by the CBH and the 2 week refinancing rate of the ECB.
3
The announced target (s
t
* ) might exert its influence on the exchange rate through direct channels – if the central bank intervenes in the foreign
exchange market – or indirectly – through its effect on expectations. As for direct interventions, the Central Bank of Hungary stressed during the
period that it refrains from using direct interventions in the foreign exchange market to influence rates inside its ±15% exchange rate band, but it
intervenes at the edges of the band. The unsuccessful speculative attack against the strong edge of the exchange rate band in 17-18 January
forced it to buy excessive amounts of euros and in the following period up until 26 May 2003, it was present in the foreign exchange market to
resell a good part of this amount. Except for this period, however, influence of the exchange rate targets on the exchange rates can be expected
to be exerted through influencing expectations by the credible promise of sustained exchange rate smoothing policies.
the estimated coefficients are not straightforward, but overall acceptable using the stability tests of
Hansen (1992).
4
The interest rate rule is estimated in the following unrestricted form
5
:
(2)
The parameter ρ represents interest rate (differential) smoothing. If β=–κ, then the estimation does not
reject the hypothesis that it is the exchange rate gap term that influences the interest rate determina-
tion. The process η
t
follows is not determined ex ante; it can be expected to follow an autocorrelated
process, as the central bank made decisions about interest rates in every two weeks up until the sum-
mer of 2004, when it switched to monthly decisions.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Dependent Explanatory variables Stability tests 
log(hufeur) const dif2w log(hufeurt) log(hufeur[-1]) LC 
-0.428** 0.010 0.34*** 0.739*** 0.606*
std.dev. (0.180) (0.062) (0.053) (0.043)
log(hufeur) const dif3m log(hufeurt) log(hufeur[-1]) LC
-0.323* 0.064 0.349*** 0.709*** 0.51
std.dev. (0.179) (0.055) (0.052) (0.043)
Dependent Explanatory variables Stability tests 
dif2w const dif2w(-1) log(hufeur) log(hufeurt) LC 
-0.135** 0.937*** 0.09** 0.065** 1.393***
std.dev. (0.063) (0.020) (0.012) (0.026)
log(hufeur) const dif3m(-1) log(hufeur) log(hufeurt) LC
-0.215*** 0.901*** 0.105*** 0.065*** 2.94***
std.dev. (0.059) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
4
The presented L
c
tests do not reject the null hypotheses of stability at 5% significance for any of the equations. One of the two – not shown – other
tests (meanF test) can never reject the null of stability at usual significance levels, though the other test (SupF test) rejects it always at the 1% level.
5
Using the interest rate differential, though unusual, offers an acceptable simplification. In small open economies, foreign interest rate can be consid-
ered exogenous (it does not react to the monetary policy of the observed country), and if the central bank is interested in influencing the exchange
rate, it is the interest rate differential that matters. Furthermore, in many cases, and certainly in Hungary during the period, the foreign interest rate was
substantially less volatile than the domestic one, so the volatility of the differential mainly comes from the decisions of the domestic central bank.
Table 1 
Estimates of the exchange rate equation using announced targets (June 2001–December 2003, weekly data)
Table 2
Interest rate differential rules using announced targets (July 2001–December 2003, weekly data)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Estimates using announced targets
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The results with different short term interest rates are presented in Table 2. The results show that the
announced exchange rate target has significant effects on the short term interest rates. They also give
some support that its effect is exerted through the exchange rate gap: the β=–κ hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the 5% level for the policy rate differentials, though it is rejected for the 3 month rates. The
estimated effects of exchange rate gap on interest rates are also significant economically: a 5% gap
would increase the interest rate by approximately 50 basis points. It should be noted, though, that the
tests reject the stability of the equations, which might be the result of changes in policy or missing vari-
ables.
The results applying the exchange rate target announcements of the Central Bank of Hungary broad-
ly support our framework and the hypothesis of exchange rate smoothing. The interest rate determi-
nation, according to the results, was significantly influenced by the exchange rate gap meaning that
the monetary policy lived up to its periodically changing exchange rate announcements and system-
atically determined its interest rates accordingly. The announced exchange rate targets, furthermore,
had important influence on the exchange rate determination. A problem with using announced pre-
ferred exchange rate targets, however, is that it is not available in many countries which use their inter-
est rate policies to influence exchange rate determination, as it is also unavailable in Hungary after the
end of 2003, when the Central Bank of Hungary stopped announcing any preferred exchange rate
explicitly.
If announcements about the exchange rate target are unavailable, unobserved variable methods can
be used to gain estimates about their development using information inherent in observables, like the
interest rate or the exchange rate. The method can also provide simultaneous estimates of the param-
eters of the interest rate rule and exchange rate equation consistent with this target.
The exchange rate equation is assumed to take the following form:
(1’)
where s
t
* here stands for the unobserved implicit (medium term) exchange rate target of the central
bank. The market participants are assumed to form rational expectations about this target.
6
The equa-
tion allows gradual adjustment to this medium term target (but by constraining the parameter of the
lagged term it requires it to be complete). The error term μ
t
is considered an unobserved premium
shock. The equation contains the lagged interest differential for primarily technical reasons
7
, but can
also be justified by portfolio adjustment lags. Notice that though equation 1' assumes that the direct
interest rate effect is lagged, the signalling effect of an interest rate move has immediate influence on
the exchange rate.
The interest rate (differential) equation is assumed to take the following form: 
(2’)
where the Central Bank of Hungary is assumed to modify its interest rate differential by reacting to the
gap between the lagged exchange rate and its current exchange rate target. The reason of this –
though it is also required by the Kalman filter – is that the regular interest rate decisions of the Central
Bank of Hungary were made on Mondays during the period, so it was only a lagged exchange rate that
it could have responded to.
The implicit exchange rate targets of the central bank (s
t
* ) are unobserved and assumed to follow a ran-
dom walk process: 
(3)
This assumption ensures that shocks to this target are permanent, and allows us to infer its value from
past behavior of observed variables. Shocks to equations 1’ (μ
t
) and 2’ (η
t
) are also unobserved vari-
ables of the system assumed to follow first order autoregressive processes: 
14
4. Unobserved variable framework
6
Rational expectations imply that market participants are assumed not to make systematic errors when forming expectations about the exchange
rate target. Formally ,where e
t
is a white noise process. If we assume that this target-expectation influences the current exchange by
affecting future exchange rate expectations according to the following equation then equation 1' can be
regained with .
7
Featuring the current endogenous observable variables among the explanatory variables makes the estimation substantially more complicated.
Unobserved variable framework
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(4)
and 
(5)
where 0≤ς,υ≤1. ε
t 
, φ
t
and ψ
t
are assumed to follow white noise processes with variances 
respectively. Specification tests of the estimated system could not reject the hypothesis that the realised
error terms are indeed white noise.
So, the estimated system consists of two observable variables: the nominal exchange rate (s
t 
) and the
nominal interest rate (i
t 
) determined by (observation) equations 1’ and 2’, and three unobservable vari-
ables: the nominal exchange rate target s
t
* , the premium shock to the exchange rate (μ
t 
)and the shock
to the Taylor type rule (η
t 
) determined by (state) equations, 3, 4 and 5. The Kalman filtering method
simultaneously estimates the 9 unknown parameters ( ) of the model and provide
the best linear estimations for the unobserved variables using the available information up to that date
(filtered estimates, , where t is a date in the past), and using all information available in the
sample (smoothed estimates, where T refers to the last element of the sample). The mean
squared error matrix of the estimated unobserved variables are P
t |t for the filtered estimates and Pt |T for
the smoothed estimates.
The matrix representation of the state space system – following the notation of Hamilton (1994) – is
going to be presented. The state equation is: 
where 
And the observation equation is 
where 
22 ,,,,,,,, ψφ σσλυςβρχγ
222
,,
The assumption of random walk target development introduces unit root to the state equation, which
hinders the application of standard asymptotic theory developed by assuming stationarity (e.g.
Hamilton, 1994). But stationarity is not a necessary condition for asymptotic convergence of the esti-
mator: Harvey (1990, pp. 210), for example, provides regularity conditions for the state space model
ensuring the asymptotic convergence of the maximum likelihood estimator. These regularity conditions
are satisfied in our model as it was shown in a related work by Csiszar (2005). A further sign of con-
vergence of our estimator is that the mean squared error of the estimates of the unobserved variables
(P
t |t and Pt |T ) show clear – and relatively fast – convergence to a fixed value.
The Kalman filter and its maximum likelihood estimation assume normality of the error terms, which
might be questionable in our case both by observation of the data and by more formal approaches. The
assumption of normality, for example, requires frequent small changes in the shocks with rare sizeable
moves. As for the exchange rate target shock (ε
t 
), this requirement can be acceptable if the target is
thought to change constantly as new information flows in. But for the shocks to the exchange rate pre-
mium (φ
t 
) and the interest rate rule shock (ψ
t 
) we can observe fairly stable periods and occasional size-
able moves not characteristic of the normal distribution. A further problem is that the shadow ERM II
exchange rate regime truncates the possible values of both the exchange rate target and the premium
shocks. White (1982) suggested a test for distributional misspecification building on the fact that in case
of correct distributional specification the estimated Hessian of the maximum likelihood function at the
optimum is equal to the negative of the outer product of the gradient at the same point. In our case, the
difference between these two matrices suggests distributional misspecification. But, as it was shown by
White (1982), even if the normality assumption does not hold, maintaining it in the so called quasi-max-
imum-likelihood framework can provide consistent parameter estimates, though the estimator will not be
efficient. The covariance matrix of the estimator, however, should be chosen and estimated differently
from the normality case.
The results presented are obtained by using the 2 week policy rate differential, which is determined by
the central banks without any expectation effects from the markets. But it should be noted that the 3
month interbank rate differentials result in very similar results both in parameter values and estimated
exchange rate targets (not shown).
Obtaining valid starting values for the parameters and the state variables are important tasks of the esti-
mation. Not surprisingly, the robustness and the convergence properties of the estimator improves sig-
nificantly, if the value of λ – determining the proportion of variance of the exchange rate premium shock
and that of the target – is restricted, so this restriction can be used to obtain starting parameter values.
The volatility of the announced target change between July 2001 and December 2003 is one fifth of the
volatility of the exchange rate change. By restricting λ to 0.2, two different (local) maximum with similar
values of log likelihood can be obtained (see appendix 6.2). The estimated interest rate (differential)
rules are fairly similar, the main difference between the two system is the relative weight given to the
exchange rate target in the exchange rate equation. While the weight is below 0.1 in the first system, it
is almost 0.9 in the second. It is only the second system of parameters, however, which stays robust
after lifting the restriction on λ.
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The estimated parameters and the obtained standard deviation assuming normality (stdev MLE) and
using the robust standard errors suggested by White (1982) (stdev QMLE)
8
for Hungary are presented
in Table 3.
The results support the hypothesis that the implicit exchange rate target influences both the interest rate
and the exchange rate determination. The interest rate differential rule finds a weekly interest rate
smoothing parameter very close to 1 and the parameter on the exchange rate gap implies that, on aver-
age, a 5% gap results in an approximately 20 basis points change. The total interest rate response to
an exchange rate gap can be obtained by cumulating the periodic interest rate moves to the gradual-
ly closing gap. The error term of the interest rate differential rule is found slightly autocorrelated, prob-
ably resulting from the fact that regular interest rate decisions were made in every two weeks up to May
2004 and monthly afterwards. The parameter of the exchange rate target term in the exchange rate
equation – differently from the estimates using the announced targets – does not significantly differ from
1, suggesting very fast convergence to the estimated exchange rate target. The parameter of the inter-
est rate, however, – contrary to the UIP hypothesis – has the wrong sign and is insignificant.
The Kalman filtering provides optimal periodic estimates for the implicit exchange rate target of the cen-
tral bank using the development of the observed variables and assuming that the parameters are as
estimated previously. The functioning of the filter is intuitive. In every period, using the current estimate
of the unobservables, the filter formulates forecasts of the observable interest rate and exchange rate
Dependent Explanatory variables Error term 
dif2w dif2w(-1) log(hufeur[-1]/hufeurt) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.994*** 0.037** 0.285*** -11.93***
stdev MLE 0.013 0.018 0.072 0.106 
stdev QMLE 3.4E-07 2.1E-07 2.1E-06 4.0E-07
log(hufeur) dif2w(-1) log(hufeurt) log(hufeur[-1]) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.104 0.867*** 0.133 0.933*** -9.65***
stdev MLE 0.249 0.083 - 0.047 0.162 
stdev QMLE 7.2E-06 1.3E-06 - 1.1E-06 4.9E-06
log(hufeurt) log(hufeurt(-1)) lambda
1.000 0.192
stdev MLE - 0.169 
stdev QMLE - 4.9E-06
Table 3
Unobserved variable estimation (May 2001–December 2004, weekly data)
8
The differences between the standard errors are substantial as a sign of the already mentioned distributional misspecification. The robust covari-
ance estimator suggested by White (1982) implies extremely significant parameters. But we cannot rule out that it underestimates the true covari-
ance matrix (as Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 396. notes, the outer product estimator of the information matrix can be poorly behaved in even moderate
samples), we presented the standard errors assuming the errors were normal.
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
for the next period. If the interest rate and exchange rate develop according to these forecasts, there
are no reasons to update the beliefs on the exchange rate target, the exchange rate premium shock,
or the interest rate rule shock. If there is a surprise caused by an unexpected interest rate or exchange
rate move, however, it is optimal to change the beliefs about the unobserved variables. But as the rea-
son for the unexpected move is unknown, it is optimal to attribute it partly to all of the unobservables
depending on the uncertainties of their development. The Kalman filter solves this complicated signal-
extraction exercise and provides estimates about the expected exchange rate and interest rate reac-
tion to these unexpected shocks.
Formally, the essence of Kalman filtering is the optimal updating of a linear projection using the infor-
mation obtained from the development of the observables. In our framework, this updating happens as
(for details, see Hamilton, 1994): 
(6)
where 
and 
The updating equation has the intuitive feature that the estimates of the unobserved variables 
change only if there is a surprise in the development of the observed variables and the effect
of the surprise is influenced by the effect of the unobserved variables on the observables (H) and the
potentially time-varying mean squared error of the prediction of the state variables . It is straight-
forward to see that 
and substituting it to  provides us with the following equation showing how periodic estimates are
updated using the new information: 
(7)
The value of Z
t
because of its already mentioned fast convergence, gets constant soon and gets equal to:
The first row of the matrix implies that a 1 percentage point surprise move in the interest rate results
in a 0.87 percent appreciation of the estimated exchange rate target. This effect is substantially
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larger than the effect of an expected interest rate move (see later). The matrix also shows that a 10
Ft (approximately 4 percent) surprise depreciation should lead to a depreciated target expectations
by around 3 Ft. The second row determines the effects on the estimated values on the shocks μ
t |t
and η
t |t .
The filtered (or one-sided) estimates of the exchange rate target of Hungary only use information avail-
able up to the period, and the smoothed (two-sided) estimates use all the available information. The
estimates and their standard error bands together with the monthly one-year-ahead exchange rate
expectations of market analysts surveyed by Reuters are shown in Figure 2, while Figure 3 presents
the development of the closely related surprise series for the exchange rate and the inter-
est rate.
According to the filtered estimates, the exchange rate target gradually appreciated up to the end of
2002, and was fairly in line with the exchange rate development during the second half of 2002. The
significant interest rate reductions and exchange rate depreciation in January 2003, however, depre-
ciated the estimated implicit exchange rate target, which dropped further in May and June following
the devaluation of the ±15% exchange rate band. It should be noted though that the estimation con-
siders the substantial depreciation of the forint in June mostly as a premium shock, with only limited
effects on the exchange rate target. These results are in line with the structural VAR estimation of
Vonnák (2005), identifying a significant risk premium shock in June 2003, but no significant monetary
policy shock in that month (compare with Figure 3). The premium shock was counteracted by the
Figure 2      
HUF/EUR exchange rate, the estimated targets and the Reuters expectations
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substantial interest rate moves of the Central Bank of Hungary in June and later in November with
appreciating effects on the estimated targets. Around the beginning of 2004, the estimated target
stabilised around 250 Ft/euro, and in the second half of 2004 it even appreciated somewhat, devel-
oping broadly in line with the exchange rate.
As the market participants are assumed to use at least as many information for developing their
expectations about the exchange rate target as the applied model, the estimated exchange rate tar-
get is also an estimate for the market expectation of the exchange rate target. Reuters prepare
monthly survey in Hungary among market participants about their exchange rate expectations. It
might be instructive to compare their average expectations to the estimated targets. The graph con-
tains an implied expected exchange rate 1 year after the survey, which might be considered a proxy
for the expected target value. Figure 2 shows that the Reuters expectations were more volatile than
the estimated implicit target, but the development of the two series are – in most cases – broadly in
line, and the framework seems to capture the most important driving forces of these expectations.
The estimated system also allows the assessment of the exchange rate and interest rate responses
to known shocks to the exchange rate target (exchange rate target shock), to the interest rate rule
(interest rate rule shock), and to the exchange rate equation (premium shock). Consider first a known
10 Ft (approximately 4%) permanent change in the implicit exchange rate target. Figure 4 presents
impulse responses about the development of the exchange rate and the interest rate. 
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Figure 3      
Forecast errors (surprises) in the observed exchange rate and interest rate developments 
(May 2001–December 2004, weekly data)
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The high parameter of the exchange rate target in the exchange rate equation ensures that a known
change in the target results in a very fast adjustment of the exchange rate to the new target, and, there-
by, the small exchange rate gap will have no significant influence on the interest rate determination. It
has to be noted, though, that the central bank might not have direct means to make a target-change
fully known, it might need to signal it by observable interest rate – or exchange rate – movements. If it
is the case, substantial unexpected interest rate move is necessary to make the public update its pre-
vious target estimate. If the interest rate were the only way for the central bank to signal its knew
exchange rate target, the order of the necessary move is estimated to be much higher than under a
known target change: for a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate, 1.15% surprise interest rate reduc-
tion is necessary ceteris paribus.
Figure 5 shows what happens to the exchange rate and the interest rate, if there is a known 1 percent-
age-point shock to the interest rate unrelated to the exchange rate gap. The graph shows that a shock
like that has a very muted estimated effect on the exchange rate (with the wrong sign). The reason is
that the shock has no effect on the target-expectations, and the direct effect of the interest rate is
estimated to be very small.
The third presented shock (in Figure 6) is a premium shock hitting the exchange rate and resulting in a
10 Ft immediate depreciation. Afterwards, the shock is allowed to disappear with its estimated average
autocorrelation coefficient. The monetary policy responds to the opening of the exchange rate gap (its
target is assumed to stay constant) and, as the impulse responses show, the interest rate increase is
estimated to reach 50 basis points in the first month and gradually increases over 1 percentage point
in the first 4-5 month before it starts decreasing. The behavior of the shock is similar to the obtained
impulse responses of a risk premium shock of Vonnák (2005).
Figure 4      
Exchange rate target shock
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2005M01 2005M04 2005M07 2005M10
HUF/EUR
—.012
—.010
—.008
—.006
—.004
—.002
.000
—.012
—.010
—.008
—.006
—.004
—.002
.000
2005M01 2005M04 2005M07 2005M10
DIF2W
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
22
Figure 5      
An interest rate rule shock
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Figure 6      
A premium shock
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The paper proposed and successfully applied an unobserved variable framework simultaneously esti-
mating an interest rate (differential) rule and an exchange rate equation for Hungary. The framework
provided evidence for exchange rate smoothing in Hungary since the widening of the exchange rate
band in May 2001 by estimating a smoothly developing unobserved implicit target and showing that the
interest rate policy reacted to the deviation of the exchange rate from this target. The model was used
to gain estimated interest rate and exchange rate responses to exchange rate target and exchange rate
premium shocks. The framework also identified why unexpected interest rate moves have stronger
exchange rate effects: they make the market participants update their previous beliefs about the cen-
tral bank's exchange rate target.
The framework applying the Kalman filter assumes normality of the development of the exchange rate
target and interest rate shocks. This assumption seems to be restrictive resulting in an inefficient esti-
mation. Assuming more general – stable – distributions for the error term of the exchange rate target
and applying the more general Sorenson-Alspach filter might generate more efficient estimation with
estimated exchange rate targets potentially closer to the announced one: with low volatility for pro-
longed periods with occasional substantial changes.
9
The estimates might also be made more realistic
by allowing for ARCH disturbances (see Csiszar, 2005). The framework, furthermore, is flexible enough
to include the effects of more fundamental variables – like inflation and output gap – on the interest rate
rule and exchange rate target developments, which was not possible for the application to Hungary
because of the lack of sufficient data. A clear potential route for future research is to apply the frame-
work to a wider set of countries with longer periods of consistent policies.
5. Conclusion
9
The approach was successfully applied to estimate inflation targets of the US Federal Reserve, and forecast US inflation by Bidarkota and
McCulloch (1998).
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7.1 Unit root tests 
PP is the Phillips-Perron, ADF is the adjusted Dickey-Fuller and KPSS is the Kwiatkowky-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin unit root tests. As the PP and the ADF tests have null-hypotheses of an existing unit root, significant
test-statistics signal integration, while the null of the KPSS test is the stationarity of the time-series, so its
insignificance shows integration. The q and p parameters show the lags used in the test equations.  
7.2 Obtaining the starting values 
The system was estimated using the Gauss code provided by Hamilton, applying the BFGS algorithm
for optimization. The starting values of the parameters and of the forecasts ( ) and mean squared
errors ( ) of the state variables are essential part of the estimation. To obtain the results presented
in the paper the starting values were chosen as: 
and 
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7. Appendix
Variables PP ADF ADF ADF KPSS Trend Process 
q=4 p=0 p=10 p=20
log(hufeur) -2.47 -2.32 -2.31 -1.74 0.34 N I(1) 
SIC -6.62 -6.56 -6.39 
dlog(hufeur) -12.56*** -12.59*** -4.56*** -2.8* 0.11 N 
SIC -6.6 -6.55 -6.37 
log(hufeurt) -0.87 -0.66 -0.92 -1.6 0.49** N I(1) 
SIC -8.04 -7.61 -7.28 
dlog(hufeurt) -9.92*** -9.94*** -4.09*** -1.64 0.24 N 
SIC -8.05 -7.65 -7.24 
difpr -1.34 -1.03 -1.64 -1.32 0.81*** N I(1) 
SIC -8.86 -8.67 -8.35 
d(difpr) -9.57*** -9.59*** -3.48*** -3.12** 0.11 N 
SIC -8.97 -8.65 -8.34 
dif3m -1.31 -1.15 -1.84 -1.5 0.79*** N I(1) 
SIC -8.43 -8.19 -7.86 
d(dif3m) -11.96*** -11.93*** -3.08** -2.63* 0.13 N 
SIC -8.44 -8.17 -7.84 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 4
Unit root tests
Appendix
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The starting parameter values were obtained by running the algorithm in the system, where the value of
λ, which determines the proportion of volatility of the exchange rate target shock and the UIP premium
shock, were restricted to 0.2. The following two tables show the obtained two sets of parameter values
and the values of the log likelihood. It shows that while the estimated interest rate differential rules are
fairly similar, there is a substantial difference between the estimated parameter of the effect of the esti-
mated exchange rate target on the development of the exchange rate: in the first estimation the para-
meter is below 0.1, while it is almost over 0.9 in the second estimation.
Dependent Explanatory variables Error term
dif2w dif2w(-1) log(hufeur(-1)/hufeurt) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.979*** 0.046** 0.281*** -11.96*** 
stdev 0.030 0.021 0.074 0.102
log(hufeur) dif2w(-1) log(hufeurt) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.028 0.089** 0.146* -9.54*** 
stdev 0.052 0.037 0.080 0.102 
Value of log likelihood: 1505.52 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Dependent Explanatory variables Error term
dif2w dif2w(-1) log(hufeur(-1)/hufeurt) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.994*** 0.037** 0.285*** -11.93*** 
stdev 0.010 0.015 0.072 0.105
log(hufeur) dif2w(-1) log(hufeurt) ar(1) log(stdev)
0.102 0.867** 0.932* -9.96*** 
stdev 0.184 0.082 0.044 0.105 
Value of log likelihood: 1502.67
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
Table 5
Restricted unobserved variable estimation no. 1. (June 2001 – December 2004, weekly data)
Table 6
Restricted unobserved variable estimation no. 2. (June 2001 – December 2004, weekly data)
This second set of parameters were accepted as initial parameter values for the unrestricted estimates
with the values:
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